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7538 Newberry Lane
Lanham-Seabrook, Maryland 20706
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Assessment of Authenticity of Tape of Speech by Indonesian Defense and Security Minister General (Ret.) L.B. Moerdani in Dili, February 3, 1990

1. To my knowledge, no evidence has been presented which would call into question the authenticity of the tape. There is only a reported assertion by official Indonesian spokesmen in New York to a Portuguese government official that the speech on the tape did not occur. Since this assertion has apparently yet not been repeated in the Indonesian press nor any substantiation of the claim made public, the assertion must be regarded as highly suspect and as having been made with political motives. A convincing Indonesian denial would have been made public and accompanied by at least some detailed evidence. The secrecy surrounding the reported Indonesian denial of authenticity in fact suggests that the Indonesian side lacks faith in its own assertion. In addition, so far as I have been able to determine, no attempts whatsoever by official Indonesian spokesmen to refute the authenticity of the tape have been made even in the Australian press where the story of the Moerdani speech first occurred.

2. In Portuguese political parties' public press remarks on the authenticity as published in the Portuguese press, I did not find any specific evidence presented of lack of authenticity, only varying assertions to the effect that authenticity had yet to be established.

3. On its face, if the tape were not authentic, it would be one of the boldest forgeries of all time, trying to present imitations of voices of <u>both</u> East Timor Governor Mario Carrascalao and Defense and Security Minister L.B. Moerdani on a single recording. Voices may seem different when a microphone is employed, as appears in this case, and when a tape is further made of a microphoned talk. Thus while scientific voiceprints rather than mere statements of persons who have heard these individuals make formal speeches would be required to state categorically these are or are <u>not</u> the voices of Carrascalao and Moerdani, there are many other indications that these are indeed their voices and own words. Most obvious is the linguistic difference in the Indonesian spoken by the two voices. Moerdani's putative voice is clearly that of an Indonesian who has spoken the language all his adult life. Carrascalao's putative voice is clearly that of a person who has learned Indonesian later in life and does not have native-like fluency. This is precisely the pattern that would be expected from their life histories. Finally, in this regard, occasional reports of forged tapes in Indonesian political trials mainly tend to involve deletion of material and selective playing of material, not imitation recordings of voices which may be more easily subject to challenge.

Phone: 301-552-3251
Fax: 301-5524465 (24 hours)
E-mail: 72436,3621 (CompuServe network)
Telex: TO: 72436,3621 (IndoPubs user number on <u>first</u> line)
followed by 3762848 (CompuServe telex address)

4. It is difficult to conceive of any party to the East Timor conflict both capable of and having the motive to make a false recording of this nature. If not authentic, the tape could only have been made by a team of exceptionally technically skilled native Indonesians remarkably informed about ongoing events in East Timor in late 1989 and early 1990. These persons would be precisely among those least likely to make such a false recording.

5. The Moerdani speech appears to end on the tape somewhat before its actual completion. He could have logically at this point gone on to discuss upcoming troop movements. While there is no way to prove or disprove this, it seems plausible that the person(s) responsible for making the tape and passing it to Australian reporter Mark Baker might have wished to delete such damaging final remarks in order to limit danger to themselves if this effort were prematurely discovered by the Indonesian military. According to the **Sydney Morning Herald**, Mark Baker has now been blacklisted from entry into Indonesia after his reportage on the tape in the **Sunday Herald** (Melbourne). If true, this policy suggests Indonesian military intelligence officials do not truly harbor doubts that the tape is authentic. Correct reporting harmful to Indonesian interests is far more likely to lead to blacklisting of foreign reporters than amateurish inaccurate news stories.

6. There is no reporting I could locate in the Jakarta press suggesting that Moerdani was in the capital area or travelling in Indonesia on February 3. In fact, he seems to have dropped out of sight for several days after making a presentation to DPR Commission I in his Ministerial capacity. This would be consistent with a secret trip to Dili. He has no difficulty making his his speeches and travels public as there exists a special group of reporters assigned to the Department of Defense and Security (Hankam) to publicize his remarks and travels except when he does not wish them to do so.

7. All the themes reiterated by Moerdani in his speech do not deviate in the slightest from known Army doctrine or established government policy. This is particularly true with regard to the creed that the Indonesian Army never surrenders. In his speech, Moerdani indicates in so many words that if the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) have not yet succeeded in crushing the armed resistance, it will continue to make all required efforts to do so. Reports have subsequently come from independent sources that the speech was followed the next day by substantial troop landings in Dili. These landings were subsequently confirmed in **Suara Pembaruan** in a story in which both Governor Carrascalao and Bishop Belo were reported as giving addresses to two newly arrived battalions of territorial troops. From yet another source came reports of serious armed hostilities around Easter involving deaths of Indonesian soldiers and East Timorese civilians conducted by one of these very same battalions in southwestern East Timor. This logical succession of events tends to strengthen considerably the case that the speech occurred and was in fact designed to prepare particularly demurring Timorese civil servants for a new military offensive.

8. The content of the speech is also wholly in line with earlier voiced Indonesian military distortions of demonstrations during the Pope's visit in 1989 and demonstrations during the American Ambassador's visit in early 1990 prior to the speech. Many independent observers have provided completely different accounts of both sets of demonstrations from the glib dismissal accounts provided by Moerdani. The content of the speech, especially its emphasis on nation-building, is consistent with the Indonesian's military's evident access to Universitas Gadjah Mada's (UGM) Center for the Study of Rural and Regional Development (P3PK)

preliminary Visit Report of August 1989 and Progress Report of January 1990 on field work conducted mainly in southwestern East Timor. While the P3PK stress on nation-building seems to have been adopted in letter by Moerdani, his stress on military means to enforce it is typically contrary to the spirit of the P3PK recommendations.

John A. MacDougall
Editor, Indonesia Publications



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